This article investigates the prevalence of financial synergies as a motive for merger and acquisition activity in the property-liability insurance industry. Two hypotheses are developed and tested based upon theories of information asymmetries and firm financing decisions (Myers and Majluf 1984): (1) that financial synergies are a primary motive for insurance mergers in general and (2) that mergers motivated by financial synergies will be more prevalent in periods following negative industry capital shocks. The hypotheses are tested via analysis of accounting ratios of acquisitions targets in the period 1980 through 1990 in relation to those of non-acquired firms of similar characteristics, and via analysis of acquisition characteristics. The hypothesis that financial synergies are a motive for mergers following negative industry capital shocks receives strong support.
INTRODUCTION
This article investigates the role that target capital needs play in mergers and acquisitions in the property-liability insurance industry.
The theoretical underpinning of the article is the work of Myers and Majluf (1984) and others who argue that firm capital structure and financing decisions are driven in part by information asymmetries between firms and capital markets. If firms possess private information about their future earnings, this can lead to an adverse selection problem: the private information will lead to lower valuations of firms with better than average earnings prospects and hence, firms with the best prospects will be most reluctant to obtain capital from external sources. This adverse selection problem raises the cost of external funds relative to that of internally generated funds for all firms, and introduces a preference among firms for internally generated capital.
The point of departure for the analysis of merger motives is the idea that the high cost of external capital caused by asymmetric information, and the associated under-investment in projects which would otherwise have positive net present value, creates potential gains from mergers between well-capitalized firms and poorly-capitalized firms (Myers and Majluf 1984) . Such gains could be realized if information asymmetries are lower between the capital-poor firms and potential acquirers than they are between the firm and other providers of capital. The acquiring firm can thus gain from the merger by exploiting its information advantage over the general equity market. In particular, in this circumstance the acquired firm is likely to be undervalued; given a capital infusion this undervalued asset will yield a high return relative to its low purchase price. This study refers to these types of mergers as being driven by financial synergies, and investigates the prevalence of this merger motive in the property-liability insurance industry.
The idea that insurance mergers could occur for financial synergies is appealing due to the significant potential for information asymmetries between insurance firms and capital markets.
1 Insurer liabilities consist primarily of loss reserves and thus are highly firm-specific and subject to both errors and discretion in the estimation of their value. Many insurer assets, like those of other service providers, are intangible and therefore difficult to evaluate by firm outsiders. Information asymmetries are likely to be especially severe for the large segment of the industry made up of closely held or thinly traded stock companies, or mutuals. Moreover, the regulation of surplus ratios in the industry limits the use of risky debt, a source of capital thought to be less costly than external equity issues. 2 Insurance companies that are capital constrained can reduce dividend payments or increase earnings retention, or issue stock. 3 The first two alternatives are likely to increase capital only incrementally and only with a time lag. If the final alternative 1 Mergers to achieve financial synergies may also be encouraged by insurance regulators concerned with protecting the solvency of the industry. The approval of mergers between a well-capitalized insurer and a weak institution would further this regulatory objective. In a related study, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) examine whether insurance mergers targets tend to be firms that are financially distressed. They find this to be true for twenty to forty-six percent of mergers targets in the period 1985 through 1992. In order to isolate mergers for financial synergies that are motivated by information asymmetries rather than regulatory pressures, this study omits transactions in which the target firm was in receivorship prior to merger, and all transactions in which the target firm was merged into the acquirer or retired following merger. 2 An offsetting effect is that regulatory reporting requirements force insurers to provide considerable information about their assets and liabilities. Some researchers have also argued that equity issues to meet regulatory requirements should lead to lower asymmetric information costs and could thus lower the cost of equity issue for insurers relative to other firms. The evidence on the relative cost of equity issues for insurers is mixed (Gron and Lucas 1995; Polonchek and Miller 1996; Akhigbe, Borde and Madura 1997) . 3 Insurers can also issue capital notes, which are essentially debt that is subordinated to policyholders and all other creditors, with interest and principal payments made only with the permission of insurance regulators. Capital notes are very similar to common or preferred stock and therefore hold the same potential for informational asymmetries. Insurers can also use reinsurance transactions to relieve certain financial ratios (Adiel 1996) ; however, regulators limit the use of reinsurance by monitoring expected reinsurance commissions to surplus. leads to asymmetric information costs, 4 insurance organizations may seek capital via alternative mechanisms such as merger or the private placement of shares.
In contrast to the literature on stock issuances, the literature associated with mergers and acquisitions and private placements finds that these transactions are not associated with stock price declines (Wruck 1989 ). In the case of mergers, the non-negative stock price reactions to these announcements may be due to gains from financial synergies, but also to factors such as economies of scale or scope or the replacement of inefficient management. We term the gains from these latter sources as arising from operating synergies. Because of the confounding effects associated with operating synergies, it is not possible to make general predictions about the placement of mergers in the financing pecking order. 5 Nonetheless, if there are information imperfections in capital markets one expects to observe some insurance mergers motivated primarily by financial synergies. Moreover, when the relative costs and benefits of equity issuances change, one should see a change in the proportion of mergers in which financial synergies play a role. This latter point suggests that mergers for financial synergies should be especially prevalent following negative industry-wide capital shocks. The property-liability insurance industry is prone to such shocks, arising from events such as natural disasters, changes in loss distributions, unexpected inflation or lower than expected investment returns, which affect most firms in the industry simultaneously. Following a negative capital shock, many more firms than usual will experience low levels of financial slack, creating more opportunities for mergers based on financial synergies. These opportunities will be heightened if information asymmetries are more severe following a negative capital shock, due to the increased uncertainty about firm's values as a result of the shock. These circumstances will make the potential gains from these mergers greater and lead to a greater preponderance of mergers motivated by financial synergies.
This line of argument suggests two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses relating information asymmetries in capital markets to insurance merger activity: (1) insurance mergers are motivated by financial synergies; (2) financial synergies are an especially important motive for merger in periods following a negative capital shock. To provide evidence on the first of these hypotheses, this study examines the pre-merger and post-merger accounting performance of ninety-two insurance subsidiaries acquired in the time period 1980 through 1990, relative to benchmark non-acquired subsidiaries. The second hypothesis is examined by comparing two sub-periods of the sample, mergers in 1985 and 1986 (the years immediately following a negative capital shock) and all other years. Additional evidence on whether mergers are motivated by financial synergies is provided by analyzing the 4 Consistent with this idea, prior research suggests that new equity issues are uncommon in the insurance industry (Gron and Lucas 1995; Poloncheck and Miller 1996) . The small volume of equity issues may be due to the scarcity of publicly traded firms in the industry; Akhigbe, Borde and Madura (1997) find that publicly traded insurers issue equity more frequently than industrial firms. However, the industry ownership structure may itself arise due to information asymmetries that insurers face in the equity markets. 5 The pecking order theory of financing choices extends the Myers and Majluf (1984) idea by suggesting that firms choose their financing based on the severity of underpricing and transactions costs associated with financing sources. determinants of capital infusions from the acquirer to the target. Candidates for acquisitions driven by financial synergies should be firms with low levels of capital, poor access to capital from alternative sources, and high franchise value. Hence, these target characteristics should be associated with capital infusions from the acquirer if such transfers are evidence of financial synergies.
To provide a preview of the results, the empirical evidence suggests that financial synergies are a significant motivating factor for mergers following negative industry capital shocks. Firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 experienced lower pre-merger solvency and liquidity, higher pre-merger underwriting leverage and greater pre-merger declines in total capital than their benchmark groups. These acquisitions also resulted in improved leverage and solvency positions for the target firms. Firms acquired following the shock were also more likely to receive a capital infusion from the new parent organization, and were much more likely to be acquired by another insurance company than firms acquired in other years. These features indicate that merger served to alleviate financial constraints for the targets acquired in 1985 and 1986, and are consistent with the notion that information asymmetries between insurers are lower than between insurers and other potential providers of capital. This interpretation is strengthened by the additional finding that targets with greater capital needs and poorer access to capital are more likely to receive a capital infusion at acquisition.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The following section describes the sample of mergers from 1980 through 1990 for which detailed accounting data were available, and the research methodology employed to analyze merger characteristics. The results of the analysis are then presented, and the final section of the article summarizes and interprets the findings.
ANALYSIS OF MERGER CHARACTERISTICS
The pre-merger and post-merger accounting statements of property-liability insurance companies acquired during the time period 1980 through 1990 are examined to provide evidence regarding the motivations for mergers. Using this sample period gives a sufficient period of time after each merger to examine performance results in the accounting data, and places the negative industry capital shock of 1984 to 1985 in the middle of the period. The latter feature of the sample reduces the likelihood that any unique characteristics of mergers in the immediate post-shock period are reflective of industry trends instead of anomalies due to the shock.
Research Method
The unit of analysis is the acquired subsidiary, as opposed to the combination of the acquirer and the acquired firm. The reason for this is data-related. Insurance organizations file statutory statements at the individual subsidiary level, making it relatively easy to track a particular subsidiary over time; but to examine the consolidated firm would have required a tedious and potentially error-ridden identification of affiliations.
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A matched-pair research design is employed to analyze the pre-merger performance, and the effects of merger on performance, of the sample of acquired firms. Each acquired company's performance is evaluated relative to the average performance of non-acquired subsidiaries which are of approximately the same size and which operate in the same line of business as the acquired subsidiaries. For each year 1977 to 1992, all non-acquired insurance companies are first classified into size deciles and into one of two business sector categories--commercial or personal.
7 Since many insurance companies write policies in more than one of these two sectors, the business sector for a given company-year is defined based on the sector with the most premiums written. Performance measures described below are then averaged in each year 1977 to 1992 within these twenty benchmark cells. Similarly, each acquired firm is assigned to one of the twenty benchmark cells based on its size decile and maximum sector of business three years before the merger; thus, the acquired company retains the same matched benchmark cell across all years analyzed. Finally, the appropriate benchmark cell performance measures are averaged for the three calendar years before and after the merger year.
The effect of a merger on performance is detected by subtracting this three year averaged benchmark from the three-year average performance for the acquired company to form a benchmarked performance measure. Improvements in performance are detected by subtracting the pre-merger benchmarked performance from the post-merger benchmarked performance. If the merger has no effect on performance, one would expect the change in benchmarked performance to be zero. More formally, let: a i,b / the acquired subsidiary (i) performance, averaged three years before (b) the merger; b i,b / the benchmark performance for subsidiary i, also averaged over the premerger (b) period. 6 This problem arises because the A.M. Best data that we use were not always updated on a year to year basis. Instead, five years of data might have been purchased at one time. Bests records affiliations as of the fifth year for all five years in the case of ownership changes, to facilitate trend analysis for financial rating purposes. 7 Insurers were initially classified into four business sector categories, including additionally reinsurance and workers compensation. The small number of reinsurance specialists in the database raised concerns about the validity of benchmark values by size decile, and hence these firms were deleted from the analysis. A comparison of worker's compensation benchmark data to that of the other commercial sector revealed no significant differences, and so workers compensation insurers were included in this more general sector. 8 Letting t denote the year of acquisitions, the variable aib denotes the average of the target's ratio over years t-3, t-2 and t-1. The variable bib is constructed by finding the mean ratio for the target's benchmark set in each year t-3, t-2 and t-1 and then averaging these values. The same procedure for years t+1, t+2 and t+3 is undertaken to construct the post-merger performance measures aia and bia.
The error components 0 ti and , t,i are assumed cross-sectionally and mutually independent. By differencing, the magnitude of the merger effect on performance is obtained, measured with error:
The effect of the merger on performance in the post-merger period is computed analogously, with a i,a denoting target performance averaged over the post-merger period, b i,a denoting benchmark performance averaged over the post-merger period. The estimate of : b , (a i,b -b i,b ), is subtracted from the estimate of : a , (a i,a -b i,a ) , to calculate the change in performance due to the merger. It is then tested whether the paired differences and the change in paired differences are zero; this is equivalent to testing whether : b and : a -: b are zero. Since the matched-paired differences in these accounting ratios tend to be skewed, standard parametric tests are inappropriate. Instead, the statistical significance of the paired differences is assessed using a sign test which examines whether there are equal numbers of positive and negative paired differences. This test requires only that the observations be independent and drawn from continuous distributions.
Performance Measures
This study's objective is to test hypotheses about the importance of financial synergies in property-liability insurance mergers. Additionally or alternatively, value-enhancement through merger can arise from operating synergies--opportunities to improve firm performance. While operating and financial synergies are not mutually exclusive, mergers motivated primarily by financial synergies should exhibit different characteristics from those primarily motivated by operating synergies. In particular, mergers to achieve financial synergies should yield short run improvements to the target firm's solvency, liquidity and leverage positions; those motivated by operating synergies should be more likely to result in improvements to the target's net income and earnings components. 9 Hence, in order to distinguish merger motives and to examine whether merger motives differ across different periods, two broad categories of performance measures are examined: those intended to measure financial synergies and those intended to measure operating synergies. The accounting measures used were chosen based upon a review of the measures used by the major financial rating companies to assess the performance and financial health of insurance companies.
The investigation into financial synergies focuses on solvency, liquidity and leverage. Solvency is measured by the ratio of policyholder's surplus to admitted assets. Policyholders' surplus is the excess of the value of the firm's admitted assets over liabilities (net of initial capital paid in) and hence represents the firm's net worth. This ratio thus shows the percentage of admitted assets which are not required for the payment of losses or other liabilities; the larger this ratio, the less 9 Of course, net income improvements will tend to improve solvency through their effect on retained earnings; and additional capital may improve net income by increasing revenue or reducing reinsurance costs. However, factors such as dividend payments and capital infusions affect capitalization independently of net income; and some components of net income (e.g. underwriting expenses and investment earnings) will not be affected by capital levels.
likely is the firm to go bankrupt. The liquidity measure is intended to capture the ability of the company to pay off reserves and is calculated by dividing liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) by total reserves. If mergers relieve financial constraints, one would expect acquired firms to exhibit low values of the solvency and liquidity ratios, and for these measures to increase following mergers.
Two measures of leverage are analyzed, underwriting leverage and reserve leverage. Underwriting leverage is measured as premium revenues net of reinsurance transactions relative to policyholders' surplus. This ratio is inversely related to the capacity of a firm to write additional business because new policies generate liabilities, which must be supported by surplus due to the limited liability of insurance companies. 10 Hence, a high volume of premiums relative to surplus means that the capacity to write new business is low. Reserve leverage is measured as total loss and loss adjustment expense reserves relative to policyholders' surplus. This ratio represents an insurer's major unpaid obligations as a percentage of net worth, and is inversely related to the firm's ability to bear loss shocks and errors in loss forecasting. If financial synergies are important determinants of mergers in the industry, one would expect acquired firms to be highly levered, and for leverage to decrease following merger. The percentage change in premium volume is also examined to provide additional insight into the leverage position of the firm. A high growth firm which is highly leveraged, may be more favorably positioned over the long term than one which is highly leveraged despite low growth.
To gain an overall measure of operating synergies, net income is evaluated, scaled both by premiums and by assets. Net income is also broken down into its components to provide insight into the sources of any improvements. In the property-liability insurance industry, net income is calculated as earned premiums less incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses and underwriting expenses, plus net investment gains or losses and other income. If mergers result in improvements to rating models or reductions in marketing and administrative expenses, say through realized economies of scale or better expense management, one would expect reductions in loss costs or underwriting costs following mergers. To detect these sources of merger benefits, the loss ratio (losses and loss adjustment expenses relative to earned premiums) and the expense ratio (underwriting expenses relative to written premiums) are included as measures of performance. In addition to the loss and expense ratios, returns to the investment portfolio are also analyzed, measured as the ratio of investment gains (losses) to premiums earned.
Finally, to provide more direct evidence on the relative importance of financial and operating synergies, some key sources of change in the policyholders' surplus of the acquired subsidiaries are analyzed. The annual change in surplus results from net income, equity capital paid in, dividends paid and other adjustments including items such as foreign currency translations, changes in admitted assets, unrealized capital gains and losses and treasury stock issues and repurchases. Given the two hypotheses of this study, the focus here is on the net income and paid-in-capital components of surplus changes. Specifically, it is tested whether 10 In addition, regulatory accounting rules require insurers to recognize underwriting expenses on new business on a cash flow basis, but income may be recognized only on a accrual basis. This generates an accounting drain on surplus associated with new business. acquired companies receive new equity capital at the time of merger, or if changes in surplus instead derive from improvements in net income. Focusing on these two components lends insight into the mechanism by which capital is increased, and hence whether mergers provide a source of external capital to the target firms. The total change in surplus is also reported to provide some indication of the importance of other omitted factors in the total surplus change.
Sample Selection
The initial sample of property-liability insurance mergers was identified through a search of both the online Mergers and Acquisitions database and Mergers and Acquisitions magazine over the relevant time period. This data source reports all merger transactions valued at over one million dollars. The sample for this study was restricted to acquisitions of United States property-liability insurance companies completed during 1980 through 1990. To focus the study on acquisitions of ongoing concerns rather than acceptances of the liabilities of insolvent firms, acquisitions of blocks of business and transactions in which the acquired firm was retired or merged into the new parent entity were excluded. This initial selection process identified 115 transactions over the period 1980 through 1990. Each transaction was further investigated in Best's Insurance Reports and, where necessary, the acquiring company's annual reports, to verify that the transaction met the sample selection criteria. This additional investigation significantly reduced the sample size, since a large number of transactions proved to be internal restructurings of existing insurance groups. A smaller number of transactions were rejected from the sample because no corroborating evidence of their occurrence could be found, or because they were acquisitions of shell or inactive companies. A total of 84 transactions involving 152 acquired subsidiaries were ultimately identified through this process.
As shown in Table 1 , a subsample of seventy-two of these transactions (100 subsidiaries) is used in the analysis of pre-merger characteristics, and sixty-six transactions (92 subsidiaries) are used in the analysis of the performance effects of mergers. This further reduction in sample size is due primarily to two additional requirements: that the acquired company report annual statements to A.M. Best Company (the source for accounting data) three years prior to the merger and that it write at least one million dollars in premiums per year. These latter sample requirements help to ensure that the companies analyzed are actively engaged in the writing of property-liability insurance, and hence that the accounting data are reliable measures of firm performance.
Also reported in Table 1 are statistics on the size of the sample firms, in terms of net premiums written, relative to their benchmark groups. The 100 acquired subsidiaries in the sample have a mean value of written premiums of $72.35 million and a median value of $25.66 million. Recall that the benchmarks were created to match firms in similar lines of business by volume of premiums written three years prior to merger. The comparison in Table 1 shows that the benchmarking procedure succeeded in matching firms by premium volume: there are no significant differences in net premiums written for the target sample and their benchmark groups, based on the sign test. Note: Benchmark portfolios are found by identifying non-acquired subsidiaries three years before the merger year that are of similar size (as measured by net premiums written) and in similar lines of business as the acquired subsidiaries. The Fraction > 0 column shows the fraction of paired differences greater than zero. The t(Mean) column reports the test statistic testing the hypothesis that the mean paired difference is zero, and the Sign Test column reports the test statistic testing the hypothesis that the percentage of paired differences greater than zero is fifty percent.
Since this study is interested in comparing merger transactions from different years in the sample period, Table 2 reports the effects of the sample selection criteria on the sample size by year. The table reports the number of subsidiaries acquired, and the number of merger transactions in each year, for the original sample and for the sample of firms used in the analysis of accounting data. The selection criteria do not substantially affect the time series properties of the data. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The Entire Sample of Acquisitions Table 3 examines the characteristics of the target firms in the sample relative to their respective benchmark groups. For each ratio examined, the table reports statistics on the pre-merger values, the post-merger values and the post-merger minus pre-merger values for those firms for which both pre-merger and post-merger data were available. The change values are also benchmarked, meaning that the results should be interpreted as indicating whether these ratios changed more for the acquired firms than for the benchmark group as a whole. Panel A of the table reports statistics on the financial characteristics of the sample. The data clearly demonstrate that the pre-merger financial position of the target firms was worse than that of the benchmark groups. Solvency and liquidity are significantly lower for the target sample, and underwriting leverage is significantly higher (based on the sign test). The values of solvency and liquidity did not improve as a consequence of merger: there are no statistically significant differences in the changes in these ratios, relative to changes for the benchmark groups. The underwriting leverage of the target firms did improve following merger, however. The table also shows that acquired firms exhibited higher premium growth in the pre-merger period and significantly higher premium growth in the post-merger period. The high premium growth, taken together with the improvement in underwriting leverage following merger, suggests that the target sample represents firms with high growth opportunities who sought merger to maintain growth.
This interpretation receives further support in Panel B of Table 3 , which examines the profitability of the target firms. This table shows that in the premerger period, acquired firms net income as a percentage of premiums was lower than that of the benchmark firms, but net income relative to assets was not significantly different from the benchmarks. This pattern in the accounting returns is consistent with the target firms having a high proportion of new business, as accounting income is understated on new policies and hence for growing firms. The finding that returns on assets are not significantly different from the benchmarks suggests that the acquired firms were doing about as well as their nonacquired counterparts prior to the merger.
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Panel B of Table 3 also reports statistics on the major components of profits: the expense, loss and investment income ratios. The pre-merger loss ratios of the acquired firms are more favorable than those of the benchmark group, and the difference is statistically significant. The acquired companies have higher benchmarked expense ratios prior to the merger, however, indicating higher selling and administrative costs (relative to premium volume). The acquired companies also have significantly lower investment income relative to invested assets in the pre-merger period. Examining the change in these ratios after the merger, there is no significant improvement in the loss ratio, but significant improvements in the expense ratio and the investment income ratio. Net income improved following merger, irrespective of whether it is measured relative to premium revenue or assets.
12 These findings suggest that operating synergies were achieved in the mergers, which resulted in improvements to profits and to some major components of profits.
Acquired firm net income relative to policyholders surplus was significantly higher than the benchmark values in the pre-merger period. This finding is most likely due to the lower surplus values exhibited by the acquired firms, as evidenced by the solvency ratio.
12
Net income relative to policyholders' surplus was also significantly improved following merger. Note: All data are derived from the A. M. Best data. Benchmark portfolios are found by identifying non-acquired subsidiaries three years before the merger year that are of similar size (as measured by net premiums written) and in similar lines of business as the acquired subsidiaries. Loss Ratio is defined as losses plus loss adjustment expenses divided by premiums earned; Expense Ratio is underwriting expenses divided by premiums written. Other ratios should be self-explanatory; a Chg refers to the post-merger three-year average ratio minus the pre-merger three-year average ratio. b Acq-Ben refers to distributions based on paired differences, that is, an acquired subsidiary's ratio minus its benchmark portfolio ratio.
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c Frac > 0 is the percentage of positive paired differences in the distribution. d t(Mean) is the t-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the mean paired difference is zero.
e Sign Test is the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that there are equal numbers of positive and negative paired differences.
f Number is the number of matched pairs upon which the distribution is based.
Overall, the data for the entire sample present a mixed picture regarding the motivations for mergers. There is some suggestion that the acquired firms were poorly capitalized (as evidenced by their liquidity and leverage positions), yet it is found that only underwriting leverage improved following the merger. In addition, these mergers yielded significant operating synergies, as net income improved due to improvements in both expenses and investment income. These results thus provide only weak support for the first hypothesis of this study, that insurance mergers will tend to be motivated by financial synergies. The mixed findings may arise from combining together mergers which occurred under different market conditions and hence occurred for different reasons. Evidence on this is provided in the next section of the article.
Acquisitions Following the Capital Shock
The second hypothesis of this study states that if informational asymmetries in capital markets are important, acquisitions following a negative industry capital shock are more likely to be motivated by financial synergies than those in other periods. To investigate this hypothesis, Tables 4 and 5 compare the benchmarked characteristics of firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 to those acquired in all other years of the decade.
13 It should be re-emphasized here that all data reported in the tables are benchmarked, and hence concerns about comparisons across different years in the sample are minimized; that is, any reported differences in mergers in 1985 and 1986 and other years should be interpreted as one set of acquisition targets being more different from their benchmark group around the time of acquisition than the other set.
In addition to the sign test, two other test statistics of use in interpreting the size and significance of any differences in the two subsamples are reported. The median test examines the hypothesis that the medians of two independent populations are the same. The Wilcoxon rank sum test examines the alternative hypothesis that one population is shifted in its entirety to the right or left of a second population. This test requires not only that the two populations be independent, but that they also not differ in dispersion. Both tests can be interpreted as indicating whether the central tendency of the paired differences for the two subsample distributions differ.
Evidence on Financial Synergies. Table 4 compares the financial characteristics of firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 to those acquired in the other years of the sample. Panel A of the table reports the pre-merger financial characteristics of each subsample relative to its benchmark. Based on the sign tests, the table indicates that both subsamples exhibited significantly lower solvency and liquidity than their benchmark groups. The 1985 to 1986 subsample also exhibited significantly higher underwriting leverage than the benchmarks. These findings support the hypothesis that acquired firms in both periods were poorly 13 1985 and 1986 are the two years following the negative capital shock in the 1980s (Gron 1994; Cummins and Danzon 1997) . Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) also use a two year definition to assess clustering of mergers after industry-level shocks. Sensitivity analysis in which the "crisis" period was defined as 1984 to 1986 or 1985 to 1987 yielded results not markedly different from those reported in the article.
capitalized prior to merger. The Wilcoxon and median tests show that there are no significant differences across the two samples for these benchmarked variables. The data on premium growth suggest that the sources of the financial constraints may differ across the two subsamples, however. Consistent with the findings for the overall sample, firms acquired in years other than 1985 and 1986 were growing significantly faster than their benchmarks. This is not the case for firms acquired in the post-shock period. The differences across the two subsamples are also statistically significant, based on both the Wilcoxon and median test statistics. Hence, the conclusion that acquired firms were high growth firms appears to be true only for the non-crisis years.
Panel B of the table reports the post-merger minus pre-merger changes in financial ratios for the two subsamples of mergers. The table documents stark differences in the performance effects of mergers in the post-shock years versus mergers in other years. Both the solvency and underwriting leverage of firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 improved relative to their benchmark groups, but this was not true of firms acquired in the other years. Benchmarked reserve leverage also declined post-merger for firms acquired in 1985 and 1986, but not for the other set of acquired firms. In addition, premium volume increased significantly for the 1985 to 1986 targets relative to their benchmarks, but not for targets in other years. All of these differences are statistically significant across the two subsamples, indicating that the financial performance of firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 improved more, relative to their benchmarks, than that of the other subsample of firms. These results support the hypothesis that financial synergies were an important motive for the merger transactions following the mid-1980s capital shock. Although pre-merger solvency and liquidity were also lower for firms acquired in other years, the data suggest that the mitigation of these constraints was not a major focus of the merger. Note: All data are derived from the A. M. Best data set. Total Surplus refers to total policyholders' surplus; Liquid Assets refers to marketable investments, short-term investments, cash and agent receivables; Total Reserves refers to loss and loss adjustment expense reserves plus the unearned premium reserve. a Frac > 0 reports the percentage of the sample with paired differences (i.e., Acquired Ratio -Benchmark Ratio) greater than zero. b This column reports the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that there are equal numbers of positive and negative paired differences for the 1985-1986 and the Other Years' sample distributions. c This column reports the test statistic generated by a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test examining the alternative hypothesis that the two distributions differ only by a shift in location.
The Journal of Risk and Insurance
d This column reports the test statistic testing the null that the medians of the two groups are equal.
e These rows report the distribution of the post-merger average percentage change in premiums written for acquired firms minus the same average for benchmark firms, instead of the post-minus pre-merger average percentage change in premiums written for acquired firms relative to benchmark firms. We report the post-merger distribution rather than the post-minus pre-merger distribution because the ratio is already expressed in terms of changes. Table 5 provides additional evidence on the importance of financial synergies as a motive for merger, by comparing the major sources of change in policyholders' surplus for the two sets of acquired firms. Panel A of the table examines surplus changes in the pre-merger period, Panel B examines the year of the merger and the Panel C examines the post-merger period. Of primary interest in this table is evidence relating to external surplus contributions following merger. In mergers motivated by financial synergies, one would expect that the post-merger improvements to solvency, liquidity and leverage would arise at least in part from capital contributions from the acquiring firm. The evidence on the importance of financial synergies for the 1985 and 1986 acquisitions would therefore be strengthened if post-merger increases in external capital are observed for these target firms.
14 Examination of the proportions of positive and negative paired differences in Table 5 (see column "Fraction > 0") suggests that external capital played a greater role in the post-shock mergers than in other mergers. Panel B shows that in the year of the merger, fifty percent of the benchmarked values display positive paired differences for the post-shock targets, whereas this is true for only twenty-four percent of the targets acquired in other years. These proportions of positive observations differ across the two samples at conventional levels of significance. This provides suggestive evidence that capital infusions were more prevalent relative to the benchmark group for firms acquired in 1985 and 1986. Note: All data are derived from the A. M. Best dataset, the schedule entitled Capital and Surplus Account, which reconciles the total change in policyholders' surplus. The total change in surplus is increased by net income, decreased by dividends, and increased by new equity issuances. In addition there are a number of miscellaneous adjustments to this account, such as unrealized capital gains and foreign exchange adjustments. The term Change in Externally Generated Surplus measures the combined increase in par plus paid in capital (termed Capital changes and Surplus adjustments in the regulatory reports). a Frac > 0 reports the percentage of the sample with paired differences (i.e., Acquired Ratio -Benchmark Ratio) greater than zero. b This column reports the t-statistic test of the null hypothesis that there are equal numbers of positive and negative paired differences for the 1985-1986 and the Other Years' sample distributions.
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c This column reports the test statistic generated by a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test examining the alternative hypothesis that the two distributions differ only by a shift in location.
d This column reports the test statistic for the null that the medians of the two groups are equal. Despite these differences, the Wilcoxon and median test statistics show no significant differences across the subsamples in external capital changes in the premerger period, the merger year or the post-merger period. 15 However, the formal test statistics are difficult to interpret for this variable due to difficulties in defining an appropriate benchmark. The problem is that this variable takes on a value of zero for a majority of both the target and benchmark firms; yet the mean value within a benchmark cell is likely to be positive, since only one nonzero value will yield this result. This results in negative values of the benchmarked differences (acquired minus benchmark) for all acquired firms that report no changes in external capital. Benchmarking this variable based upon medians rather than means was also tried, and in this case the subsample distributions differ in the direction predicted by our hypotheses. However, the data suggest that the appropriate expectation for external capital is zero, and hence a zero benchmark is legitimate. Although not reported in the table, analysis of external capital changes using a zero benchmark yields results which are strongly supportive of the second hypothesis of this study: firms acquired in the 1985 to 1986 period received significantly more external capital in the year of the merger than firms acquired in other years. For firms acquired in 1985 and 1986, the mean value of external capital changes in the merger year was 8.2 percent of assets and the median was 3.2 percent; for firms acquired in other years the mean and median merger-year changes in external capital were 3.5 percent of assets and 0 percent, respectively. These differences are statistically significant using both the Wilcoxon and median tests (test statistics of 2.11 and 1.86, respectively).
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There are several other results of interest in Table 5 . Focusing on the total change in surplus, the sign tests in Panel A show that total surplus is declining in the pre-merger period for the post-shock targets, whereas this trend is not observed for mergers in other years. The Wilcoxon and median tests confirm that the decline in surplus is worse for the post-shock firms than for those acquired in other years. Panel B suggests that this trend is reversed in the year of the merger, when the firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 show greater improvements in total surplus.
The table also demonstrates that poor operating results contributed to the decline in capital for the firms acquired in 1985 and 1986, as benchmarked premerger net income was worse for these firms than for the other acquired firms. There is no evidence in Panel B that improvements to net income helped to reverse the declining surplus for the 1985 to 1986 sample in the year of the merger; however, in the post-merger period both samples show evidence of higher net income than their benchmark groups (see Panel C). Thus, Panel B and C together 15 These differences were statistically significant in sensitivity analysis defining the crisis period as either 1984 to 1986 or 1985 to 1987; as a group, firms acquired in these years received significantly more external capital in the merger year, relative to their benchmarks, than firms acquired in other years. 16 Note that in the unbenchmarked data 53.8 percent of firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 had positive external capital flows in the merger year as did 31.8 percent of firms acquired in other years. Recall that in the benchmarked data the fraction of positive differences was fifty percent for the 1985 to 1986 mergers and 24.2 percent for mergers in other years. This supports the interpretation that the differences in the two sets of findings arise from the statistical properties of the benchmark difference distribution rather than large numbers of benchmark firms exhibiting positive values of external capital flows. document that two factors contribute to improved solvency and leverage for the 1985 to 1986 targets. In the merger year, external capital was injected into the acquired companies, and in the post-merger period, internally generated capital was obtained from improved net income.
Evidence on operating synergies. The results for post-merger net income documented in Table 5 are consistent with the existence of operating synergies for both sets of mergers. Table 6 expands the analysis of the role of operating synergies as a motive for mergers within the two subsamples of acquisition targets. Panel A of the table compares the pre-merger values of income and its components for the two sets of firms, relative to the values for benchmarks. Consistent with the results for the financial ratios, the Wilcoxon and median tests reveal statistically significant differences in the pre-merger bottom-line operating performance of the 1985 to 1986 targets and those acquired in other years. As already seen in Table 5 , the median firm in the 1985 to 1986 sample earned 2.1 percent less on admitted assets than its benchmarks, whereas the median firm in the other-year sample earned 0.5 percent more. Further differences are observed in the components of net income. While both sets of firms experienced lower investment returns than their benchmark groups, firms acquired in 1985 and 1986 exhibited no significant differences from the benchmark loss and expense ratios. Data for the other time periods, and the results for the sample as a whole, show that targets had lower loss ratios and higher expense ratios than their benchmark group. These data thus suggest the potential for operating synergies from merger in both samples of firms, but the nature of the opportunities differs. Note: All data are derived from the A. M. Best dataset. The Loss Ratio is defined as losses plus loss adjustment expenses divided by premiums earned; the Expense Ratio is underwriting expenses divided by premiums written. a Frac > 0 reports the percentage of the sample with paired differences (i.e., Acquired Ratio -Benchmark Ratio) greater than zero. b This column reports the t-statistic test of the null hypothesis that there are equal numbers of positive and negative paired differences for the 1985-1986 and the Other Years' sample distributions.
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d This column reports the test statistic for the null that the medians of the two groups are equal.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the post-merger minus pre-merger changes in net income and its components for the two subsamples of mergers. There are no statistically significant differences across the two subsamples in changes in individual profit components. However, both groups independently show evidence that operating synergies were realized, and as foreshadowed by Panel A, the source of these synergies differed. Sign tests for targets acquired in 1985 and 1986 show no statistically significant improvement in any earnings component, but significant improvement in overall net income. In contrast, for the targets acquired in other years of the sample there is no improvement in overall net income relative to the benchmarked companies; yet there is significant improvement in both the expense ratio and the investment ratio. Thus, for this second group of firms specific areas of improvement appear to be the focus of merger synergies.
The overall effects of merger on bottom-line operating performance are more dramatic for the 1985 to 1986 targets than for the remaining sample of firms. Both the median and Wilcoxon tests suggest that benchmarked net income improved by more for the 1985 to 1986 subsample than for targets acquired in other years. Interestingly, this pattern is consistent with the performance patterns associated with mergers to replace bad management. Prior research on mergers often takes as an indicator of a badly managed firm the fact of poor pre-merger performance, and Martin and McConnell (1991) found that mergers in which management was replaced are characterized by under-performance prior to merger and greater postmerger performance improvements. Thus, while the evidence thus far is consistent with the hypothesis that the 1985 to 1986 mergers were motivated by financial synergies, it may also be the case that these mergers were disciplinary in nature. Some additional evidence on this is provided in the following section.
Supplementary evidence. Table 7 provides additional data to help solidify the evidence on the importance of financial synergies in the 1985 to 1986 mergers. The table reports the fraction of transactions for which target management was replaced following the merger, the fraction for which the acquiring firm injected capital into the target, and the fraction for which the acquiring entity was not another property-liability insurer. These data were hand-collected by reading the discussions of the acquired companies' history and management contained in Best's Insurance Reports.
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Target management is coded as replaced if the CEO or president of the target firm was replaced by someone other than an existing officer of the firm in the merger year or the year following. The target is coded as receiving a capital infusion if the report of the merger mentions that this occurred. The acquiring firm is coded as coming from outside the industry if the acquirer did not have any other property-liability insurance subsidiaries at the time of the acquisition. The table reports these data both for the initial sample of transactions and for the smaller sample used in the analysis of accounting ratios. All data are reported for each sample as a whole, and for the subsamples of mergers occurring 17 The statistics in Table 7 are reported at the transaction level rather than the subsidiary level due to concerns about the independence of the hand-collected data for subsidiaries acquired by a single firm. In the vast majority (although not in all) of the transactions, the management replacement and capital infusion decisions were the same for all subsidiaries acquired in a single merger transaction.
in 1985 and 1986 versus those in other years. The table reports test statistics for the null hypothesis that the proportions of transactions with the characteristics of interest are identical in the two subsamples. The test statistic is based upon the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. The table shows that in both the original sample of 84 transactions and the surviving sample of seventy-two transactions, the proportion of transactions with capital infusions in 1985 and 1986 is significantly greater than the proportion in the other years. In the surviving sample, forty-five percent of the 1985 and 1986 targets received a capital infusion from the new parent, whereas this was true for only 13.5 percent of targets in other years. This strengthens the evidence that financial synergies were important in the 1985 and 1986 mergers, as it verifies that the external capital flows in the merger year were not obtained from new equity issues, but from the acquiring firm.
The data on target management replacement can be interpreted as indicative of whether a merger was disciplinary in nature. In the original sample of transactions, management was replaced in 58.3 percent of the 1985 and 1986 acquisitions and 38.3 percent of the acquisitions in other years. 18 These proportions differ at only the ten percent significance level. In the sample for which complete accounting data were available, forty-five percent of the 1985 to 1986 acquisitions involved management replacement, whereas this was true for 36.5 percent of the surviving sample for the other years. These proportions do not differ at conventional levels of significance. Thus, within the sample of acquisitions analyzed in detail, the hypothesis that the proportion of disciplinary mergers in the two sub-periods is identical cannot be rejected. Despite poorer pre-merger performance, acquisitions in 1985 and 1986 were no more likely than those in other years to have management replacement as an objective. This provides suggestive evidence in support of the hypothesis that opportunities arising from information asymmetries led to these mergers.
Finally, Table 7 provides evidence on the incidence of horizontal mergers in the two sub-periods of the sample. This article has argued that following negative capital shocks the problems associated with raising capital from a largely anonymous capital market will be especially severe, and that information asymmetries between insurance firms should be smaller than those between a capital constrained insurer and the larger market. If these arguments are true one would expect a larger fraction of horizontal mergers during the 1985 to 1986 subperiod than during other years. This pattern is firmly demonstrated in the table.
For both the original sample and that used for the ratios analysis, a significantly higher incidence of horizontal mergers is found in the 1985 to 1986 time period than in the other years of the sample. In the ratios sample, 32.7 percent of acquisitions in non-crisis years were made by firms from outside of the industry; in 1985 and 1986 this dropped to only 10 percent. In short, despite the industry-wide decline in capital following the negative shock of 1984, firms from outside the industry were less likely to acquire firms in this time period and provide needed capital. Especially in light of the fact that the sample of transactions eliminates merged and retired targets, and hence the 1985 and 1986 transactions do not represent exits due to impending insolvency, this finding is supportive of the idea that insurers face constraints to capital-raising due to informational asymmetries. This interpretation is strengthened by the additional finding (not reported in the table) that for the sample as a whole, only two of the twenty-four target subsidiaries that received a capital injection from the acquirer were acquired by firms outside of the property-liability insurance industry. Thus the vast majority of capital infusions were provided in horizontal mergers.
Additional Evidence on Capital Infusions
This section of the article further analyzes the incidence of capital transfers from the acquiring firm to the target in the year of the merger, using the hand-collected data obtained from Best's Insurance Reports. The hypotheses put forward 18 Looking at the samples overall, management was replaced in 44 percent of the merger transactions in the original sample, and 38.9 percent of the mergers in the ratios sample. These numbers are in line with the findings of Martin and McConnell (1991) for a cross-section of industries. These authors documented a 41.9 percent management turnover rate for targets of tender offers.
regarding mergers for financial synergies predict that mergers for financial synergies, and hence capital transfers to the acquired firm, will be more likely when the acquired firm had low pre-merger capital and when asymmetric information in insurance markets is particularly great. This implies that the likelihood of a target receiving a capital infusion should be inversely related to the acquired firm's premerger capitalization, and that poorly capitalized targets in the post-shock period of 1985 and 1986 should be especially likely to receive capital at acquisition. In addition, asymmetric information arguments suggest that poorly capitalized targets with high franchise value and few opportunities for raising capital should be more likely to be acquired for financial synergies, and hence more likely to receive a capital infusion from the acquirer.
These hypotheses regarding the relationship between capital infusions, target capital needs, target firm characteristics and market conditions are tested by estimating several logistic models of the probability that an acquired firm received a capital infusion from the acquirer in the year of the merger. The variable measuring the target's capital needs is drawn from our earlier analysis of targets' pre-merger solvency, liquidity, underwriting leverage and surplus changes relative to benchmarks. Because introducing all of these variables into the regression model introduces problems of multicollinearity, they are combined to create an index variable equal to the sum of the number of a target's capital ratios which were below its benchmark value in the pre-merger period. This measure of the target's capital need thus takes on integer values ranging from zero to four. Some model specifications also include a dummy variable for the 1985 and 1986 postshock years, and in some models the capital need variable is interacted with the 1985 and 1986 dummy variable, to test whether capital infusions were more likely for capital-poor firms in this time period.
Opportunities to raise capital from other sources are captured by the premerger organizational affiliation of the acquired firm. For this purpose, targets sold by an existing insurance group are distinguished from all other targets. 19 Due to insurance subsidiaries' access to the internal capital of the parent and the low asymmetric information costs between the parent and the subsidiary, these targets should have greater access to low-cost capital than single company targets, targets owned by non-insurance firms and targets sold as part of the sale of an entire group. Hence, acquisitions involving subsidiaries sold by an insurance group should be less likely to be motivated by financial synergies. While a firm's franchise value is extremely difficult to measure, one attribute that might be related to franchise value is a firm's distribution system. We hypothesize that, all else equal, direct writers--firms that distribute through exclusive agents, employees or mass marketing--will have higher franchise value since this distribution method entails greater investments in brand name capital, and is often associated with independent rate-setting. 20 These variables are interacted with the capital needs index variable, to test the hypothesis that capital-poor firms with few outside opportunities for capital raising and high franchise value are more likely to be involved in acquisitions for financial synergies.
The results of estimating the logit models are reported in Table 8 . All models include the index of the target's capital need; the second and third models include variables related to the 1985 and 1986 crisis years; the final two models include the proxies for the target firm's access to capital and its franchise value. The estimation results firmly demonstrate that firms with greater capital needs are more likely to receive a capital infusion at acquisition, as the capital need variable is positive and significant in four of the five models estimated. This confirms that capital infusions are emblematic of mergers for financial synergies. Model 2 also shows that capital infusions are also more likely in the post-shock years, consistent with the hypothesis that acquisitions for financial synergies were more prevalent in this time period. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the capital need variable remains significant in this model. When the capital need variable, the crisis dummy and the capital need-crisis interaction variable are included together, the statistical significance of all of these variables is reduced due to multicollinearity but the signs of each of the variables remains as predicted. The proxy variable for target capital access also comes in with the predicted sign, and is statistically significant. This indicates that capital-poor firms sold by insurance groups are less likely to receive capital infusions, as predicted if information asymmetries underlie mergers for financial synergies. The measure of target franchise value also has the expected sign, and is statistically significant when the post-shock dummy variable is not included in the model. Thus, there is some evidence that capital-poor firms with high franchise value are more likely to be acquired for financial synergies.
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Variables indicating whether the target independently sets rates, whether the target sells specialty products, and the age of the target at the date of acquisition were also tried. These variables tend to be correlated with direct writing, and none of them were significant in the logit models. 
CONCLUSION
This article examines whether financial synergies are a motivating factor in insurance mergers in general, and whether financial synergies are particularly important drivers of mergers following shocks to industry-level capital. Analysis of 100 insurance subsidiaries acquired between 1980 and 1990 provides strong evidence for only the latter hypothesis. For mergers taking place in the two year period following the negative industry capital shock in 1984 to 1985, we observe declining trends in target surplus before the merger, the relaxation of target financial constraints following merger, and capital infusions to the target from the acquiring organization. These are all features of mergers to achieve financial synergies. This study thus provides evidence of constraints to external capital-raising in the industry, of sufficient magnitude to be detectable in the data at times when many firms are in need of additional capital. The targets acquired in the post-shock years raised significantly more external capital than their non-acquired benchmarks in the year of the merger, and this capital was received from the new parent. In addition, the incidence of horizontal mergers in the industry was significantly increased following the 1984 to 1985 shock, suggesting that the shock may have increased information asymmetries which made external capital raising difficult. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that transactions in which the target firm was merged or retired were eliminated from the analysis. This reduces the likelihood that the firms in the sample were acquired due to regulatory pressures to acquire firms financially distressed by the capital shock.
Analysis of the determinants of target capital infusions supports the interpretation that capital infusions are integrally related to mergers for financial synergies: capital-poor targets, especially those with fewer alternatives for capital raising, were significantly more likely to receive a capital infusion than other target firms. This finding strengthens conclusions regarding financial synergies, by directly relating capital infusions to target firm and market characteristics rather than the year of acquisition alone.
This article also extends Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and other studies of industry level merger activity such as Esty, Narasimhan and Tufano (1996) . Unlike previous studies, this study examines how merger motives (rather than numbers of mergers) may vary with industry level shocks. A key finding of the study is that the 1980s capital shock in the insurance industry altered the underlying motives for mergers; this finding is important in that it highlights that merger motives will likely differ based on industry level circumstances. Future research examining the interrelationship of merger patterns and merger motives at the industry level would provide additional insights into the determinants of restructuring activity.
